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Objective To examine the level of stated compliance with public health pandemic influenza control measures and explore factors 
influencing cooperation for pandemic influenza control in Australia.
Methods A computer-assisted telephone interview survey was conducted by professional interviewers to collect information on the 
Australian public’s knowledge of pandemic influenza and willingness to comply with public health control measures. The sample 
was randomly selected using an electronic database and printed telephone directories to ensure sample representativeness from 
all Australian states and territories. After we described pandemic influenza to the respondents to ensure they understood the 
significance of the issue, the questions on compliance were repeated and changes in responses were analysed with McNemar’s 
test for paired data.
Findings Only 23% of the 1166 respondents demonstrated a clear understanding of the term “pandemic influenza”. Of those 
interviewed, 94.1% reported being willing to comply with home quarantine; 94.2%, to avoid public events; and 90.7%, to postpone 
social gatherings. After we explained the meaning of “pandemic” to interviewees, stated compliance increased significantly (to 97.5%, 
98.3% and 97.2% respectively). Those who reported being unfamiliar with the term “pandemic influenza,” male respondents and 
employed people not able to work from home were less willing to comply.
Conclusion In Australia, should the threat arise, compliance with containment measures against pandemic influenza is likely to be high, 
yet it could be further enhanced through a public education programme conveying just a few key messages. A basic understanding 
of pandemic influenza is associated with stated willingness to comply with containment measures. Investing now in promoting 
measures to prepare for a pandemic or other health emergency will have considerable value.
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Introduction
To limit the spread of disease during the early containment 
phase of an influenza pandemic response, WHO recommends 
the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), includ-
ing public education, social distancing, home quarantine and 
travel restrictions.1 These control measures are reflected in the 
Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza.2 
However, compliance with this approach is dependent on 
community understanding of the required control measures 
and their value in disease mitigation.3 Historical records show 
that if NPIs are promptly implemented during pandemics, 
disease transmission can be reduced,4–7 an observation sup-
ported by mathematical modelling.8
This study examines the Australian public’s understand-
ing of pandemic influenza, its expressed willingness to comply 
with public health containment measures, and factors influ-
encing compliance.
Methods
Study participants and study protocol
A cross-sectional computer-assisted telephone interview sur-
vey of a representative sample of Australians aged 18 years and 
over was conducted in June 2007. The latest Australian tele-
phone database available electronically, the 2002 Electronic 
White Pages, was used to provide sample proportions for all 
states and territories. By using a random number generator, 
a corresponding sample of names, addresses and telephone 
numbers was drawn from the 2007 printed telephone directo-
ries according to telephone exchange regions. An introductory 
letter was dispatched to all households a week before telephone 
contact was made. Experienced telephone interviewers made 
calls between 09:00 and 20:00 local time, with up to seven 
contact attempts made for each randomly-selected telephone 
number. The adult household member whose birthday was 
closest to the interview date was invited to participate. Those 
eligible were people 18 years or older who provided verbal 
consent and could converse in English.
Sample size was calculated for an a of 0.05 and a 
power (1 − b) of 0.80 using prevalence information from 
a comparable study in the United States of America (USA).9 
We estimated that approximately 1200 respondents would 
be required to provide statistically sound estimates at the 
national level.
Interview questions covered five principal areas: demo-
graphics and household circumstances, knowledge about 
pandemic influenza, expressed willingness to comply with 
589Bull World Health Organ 2009;87:588–594 | doi:10.2471/BLT.08.060772
Special theme – Public health communication
Understanding of pandemic influenza in AustraliaKeith Eastwood et al.
containment measures, barriers to com-
pliance with containment measures, 
and the preferred method for receiving 
health communication. In this report, 
the exact questionnaire wording is re-
corded in italics.
From a total of 2201 telephone 
contacts, there emerged 1166 success-
ful interviews; 846 refusals (279 gave 
no reason, 248 stated no interest, 115 
householders did not pass the call 
through to the eligible person, 58 indi-
cated being too busy, 53 felt too ill, 93 
gave miscellaneous reasons) and 189 
cases of ineligibility (reasons recorded 
for 159: 111 were non-English speak-
ing, 24 were at business numbers, 15 
had an illness that limited comprehen-
sion and 9 had hearing difficulties). 
This resulted in a participation rate of 
58.0%.
Interview procedure
Participants were asked if they under-
stood the term “pandemic influenza”. 
Those that answered in the affirmative 
were then asked four questions, each 
with two possible reply options. Follow-
ing this, to ensure that all respondents 
were able to answer the remaining ques-
tions regardless of their knowledge of 
influenza, everyone was informed that 
“pandemic influenza is a disease that is 
spread between people”. The compliance 
questions were asked early in the inter-
view and repeated towards the end after 
the following information was provided: 
“We are talking about an entirely new 
type of influenza virus that spreads easily 
from person to person. No one would 
have natural immunity to it and every 
age group could be affected. Potentially 
a quarter to a third of the population 
could get sick. In the 1918 Spanish flu 
pandemic at least 40 million people died 
and a third of the world’s population was 
infected. In this case, the usual flu vac-
cine would not have prevented illness”.
Statistical methods
The change in reported willingness to 
comply with public health measures 
before and after providing informing 
on pandemic influenza was assessed 
using McNemar’s test for paired data. 
Through univariate logistic regression 
models, we identified factors potentially 
related to non-compliance with pro-
posed measures, and multivariable lo-
gistic regression models were developed 
using a backward stepwise procedure. 
Base SAS and SAS/STAT components 
of SAS 9.13 statistical software (SAS In-
stitute Inc., Cary, NC, USA) were used 
for all analyses. The sample population 
was weighted to the age-sex distribution 
of the Australian adult population in all 
models.10 Results are presented as odds 
ratios (ORs) and their 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs).
Ethics
Ethics approval was obtained from the 
Hunter New England Human Research 
Ethics Committee (approval number 
07/04/18/5.06).
Results
The estimated resident Australian popu-
lation for 2006 was used to assess the 
representativeness of the study sample.10 
There were more females (61.6%) 
than males and older age groups were 
moderately over-represented, but geo-
graphically the sample closely reflected 
the Australian population distribution. 
In 140 (12.0%) cases a language other 
than English was spoken at home and 
sample data closely matched census 
data in terms of education.11 Unless 
otherwise stated, the denominator used 
for the analysis was the complete sample 
of 1166 individuals.
Knowledge of pandemic influenza
When asked whether they were “familiar 
with the term pandemic flu or pandemic 
influenza”, 44.3% of participants replied 
that they were, 31.1% were unsure and 
24.5% reported not having heard the 
term. Those who claimed familiarity 
were then asked:
1. if the disease “(a) was usually mild 
and rarely caused death; or (b) could 
be serious with some deaths expect-
ed” – 97.3% answered correctly (b);
2. if the disease “(a) could spread with-
in a single country; or (b) spread 
through all countries” – 86.5% an-
swered correctly (b);
3. if “(a) all ages could be affected; or if 
(b) the young and elderly were most 
likely to be affected” – 66.7% an-
swered correctly (a);
4. if the disease “(a) is easily spread by 
coughing and shaking hands; or (b) 
not” – 86.1% answered correctly (a).
Among this group, 50.9% of respon-
dents provided correct answers to all 
four questions. Of the 517 who claimed 
to know about pandemic influenza, 
33.1% thought there had been cases 
in the last 5 years, 60.9% correctly re-
ported no cases and 6.0% were unsure.
Risk perception
After being informed that “pandemic 
influenza is a disease that is spread 
between people”, respondents were 
asked if they considered it likely that 
pandemic influenza would occur in 
Australia in the next 5 years. Overall, 
15.2% thought it likely, 44.4% thought 
it somewhat likely, 24.3% considered it 
not very likely, 7.0% thought it not at 
all likely, and 9.1% reported not know-
ing. Of the 476 respondents in paid 
employment but not self-employed, 
14.1% indicated that their employer 
had made business continuity plans for 
a pandemic or similar emergency.
Willingness to comply
All respondents were asked if they were 
willing to comply with specific public 
health containment measures. Re-
sponses were graded as either compli-
ance or non-compliance (“don’t know” 
responses were included in the latter 
group). This question was repeated 
towards the end of the interview after a 
brief description of pandemic influenza 
had been provided (Table 1).
Home quarantine
Willingness to comply with home 
quarantine was analysed according to 
demographic data (Table 2). We found 
that gender, being employed but un-
able to work from home and having a 
basic knowledge of pandemic influenza 
(respondents who provided correct an-
swers to all four questions) were statisti-
cally associated with stated willingness 
to comply. When these parameters 
were included in a multivariate model, 
they remained statistically significant 
(Table 2).
Overall, 75.5% of respondents an-
swered having someone who could care 
for them if they were in home quaran-
tine. For fever monitoring, 56.6% of re-
spondents reported owning a functional 
thermometer. In 52.5% of households 
there was an occupant requiring daily 
medication and 51.8% reported having 
food storage for 7 days or less.
Financial independence
Of the 611 employed respondents 
(52.4% of the total sample), 36.7% 
reported no current leave entitlements 
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Table 1.  Stated intention to comply with control measures before and after briefly describing pandemic influenza to a sample of 
Australian adults surveyed by telephone, 2007
Question Before After Percentage point change 
(95% CI)
Yes No Yes No
% % % %
1.  If told you might have had contact with pandemic 
influenza, would you stay home 7–10 days to avoid 
exposing others?
94.1 5.9 97.5 2.5 3.4 (2.2–4.6)
2.  If told you needed to avoid public events, would you? 94.2 5.8 98.3 1.7 4.1 (2.9–5.4)
3.  If told you needed to postpone social gatherings, 
would you?
90.7 9.3 97.2 2.8 6.5 (4.9–8.0)
CI, confidence interval.
and 27.2% had up to 4 weeks. If the 
emergency went beyond 2 weeks, 
30.4% reported they would experience 
financial difficulties.
Social distancing
Of respondents from the 394 house-
holds with children, 96.7% claimed 
they would keep the children away from 
others for one month if schools and 
child-care facilities were closed. If their 
“town or neighbourhood were placed 
in quarantine”, 84.8% reported that 
they would “very likely” stay within the 
quarantine area, 10.4% said they would 
be “somewhat likely” to stay, 2.0% were 
“not too likely” and 2.8% were “not at 
all likely” to stay. Of the 581 respon-
dents who had used air transport in the 
past 12 months, 97.2% reported being 
willing to avoid air travel for a month 
if requested.
Additional measures
In the event of exposure to pandemic 
influenza, 88.3% of respondents re-
ported being willing to take antiviral 
medication, but when told the drugs 
were “not guaranteed to be effective 
and could cause some minor side effects 
like stomach discomfort” this propor-
tion dropped to 70.0%. Reasons for 
refusal included a fear of side-effects, a 
preference for natural therapies and will-
ingness to accept the risk that exposure 
may lead to disease. When asked “during 
a pandemic, would you wear a surgical-
type mask when mixing with people 
in public if asked to do so?” 95.1% of 
participants reported being willing 
to comply with this control measure. 
When asked if they were willing to 
present to a special assessment clinic 
as requested instead of to their general 
practitioner if they thought they had 
pandemic influenza, 94.0% answered 
affirmatively.
Communication
The single “preferred method for receiv-
ing detailed information on important 
health issues” was stated to be televi-
sion (31.2%) mail (27.8%), Internet 
(13.9%, with 68.1% reporting home 
Internet access), radio (13.8%), news-
papers (11.0%) and other (2.3%). The 
person most trusted “to provide reliable 
health information to the media” was 
the state/territory chief medical officer 
(44.3%), a local health spokesperson 
(28.4%), the Prime Minister (16.1%), 
the state premier/chief minister (3.1%), 
and 7.9% of respondents were unsure. 
When seeking “more information on 
pandemic flu”, contacting a general 
practitioner was the preferred option 
(33.2%), followed by; accessing an of-
ficial web site (31.8%), telephoning a 
health hotline (29.2%) and contacting 
the public health unit (4.4%).
Discussion
Only 44% of this national sample of 
adult Australians reported any knowl-
edge of the term “pandemic influenza”, 
a finding similar to that of a study con-
ducted in the USA in 2006 in which 
41% of respondents had previously 
heard of this term.9 Further investiga-
tion revealed that only 51% of Austra-
lian respondents familiar with the term 
were able to correctly answer all four 
basic knowledge questions, so that the 
true proportion of Australians with a 
reasonable understanding of pandemic 
influenza may be as low as 23%. Our 
multivariable logistic regression model 
showed a strong association between 
a demonstrated basic knowledge of 
pandemic influenza and willingness to 
comply with home quarantine. These 
findings lend support to the value of a 
campaign to improve knowledge before 
an actual health emergency, as the 
threat of a serious disease outbreak can 
generate fear and misapprehension and 
thereby complicate response efforts if 
the public is ill-informed.12
In an early containment response, 
control of pandemic influenza and 
other emerging communicable diseases 
for which no vaccines are currently 
available is dependent on community 
compliance with NPIs.4–6 The level of 
compliance may be influenced through 
the provision of accurate information 
delivered within a structured commu-
nication programme.13 Distribution of 
promotional material during the inter-
pandemic period will demonstrate to 
the public that health authorities are 
transparent about the risk and have 
containment plans in place. This has 
the added benefit of allowing people 
to accept socially unfamiliar control 
measures such as wearing masks and 
home quarantine, before a pandemic 
occurs. The strategy should also include 
the promotion of personal infection 
control practices, such as hand wash-
ing, fever-monitoring and staying at 
home when sick − all lifestyle activities 
that would protect against any commu-
nicable disease.
Our findings suggest that in Aus-
tralia, television, direct mail-out, the 
Internet and the radio are the preferred 
media for disseminating information 
about pandemic influenza. When 
it comes to pandemic information, 
people appear to trust state or local 
health representatives above politicians. 
Our finding that general practitioners 
were the preferred source of additional 
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Table 2. Stated intention to comply with home quarantine following exposure to pandemic influenza in a sample of Australian adults 
surveyed by telephone, 2007
Characteristic n Compliance 
%
Non-
compliance 
%
Univariate models 
predicting 
non-compliance 
OR (95% CI)
Final multivariable 
models predicting 
non-compliance 
OR (95% CI)
Gender
Male 448 92.2 7.8 2.1 (1.3–3.4) 2.0 (1.3–3.1)
Female 718 95.3 4.7 1.0 1.0
Age, in yearsa NI
18–39 249 93.2 6.8 2.1 (1.0–4.5)
40–64 600 93.5 6.5 1.7 (0.8–3.7)  
65+ 316 95.9 4.1 1.0  
Highest education levela NI
University 283 93.6 6.4 1.0 (0.5–1.8)  
Technical college 272 94.5 5.5 0.9 (0.5–1.7)  
Year 11 or 12 196 92.9 7.1 1.0 (0.5–1.9)  
Primary to year 10 414 94.7 5.3 1.0  
Location NI
Urban 832 93.6 6.4 1.6 (0.9–2.8)
Rural/remote 334 95.2 4.8 1.0  
Children in household NI
No 772 94.0 6.0 1.2 (0.8–1.9)
Yes 394 94.2 5.8 1.0  
Employment situationa
Self-employed, unable to work from home 29 79.3 20.7 7.3 (3.0–17.5) 4.9 (2.3–10.5)
Self-employed, able to work from home 105 97.1 2.9 0.6 (0.1–2.3) 0.6 (0.2–1.8)
Wage earner, unable to work from home 369 89.2 10.8 3.4 (1.9–6.0) 3.3 (2.0–5.4)
Wage earner, able to work from home 107 96.3 3.7 1.2 (0.4–3.2) 1.2 (0.5–2.8)
Not in paid employment 555 97.1 2.9 1.0 1.0
Knowledge of pandemic flu
“Unsure/never heard of term” 649 92.9 7.1 2.8 (1.4–6.1) 3.0 (1.6–5.7)
“Yes,” < 4 replies to questions correct 254 94.9 5.1 1.6 (0.7–3.9) 1.8 (0.8–3.7)
“Yes,” all 4 replies to questions correct 263 96.2 3.8 1.0 1.0
CI, confidence interval; NI, not included in the final model; OR, odds ratio.
a  One person did not answer.
information highlights the importance 
of including them in any communica-
tion plan for the containment of pan-
demic influenza. An Australian study 
conducted in 2004 also showed that 
general practitioners were regarded by 
the public as a source of reliable in-
formation during emerging infectious 
disease threats.14
The low percentage of respondents 
who considered pandemic influenza 
likely to occur in the next 5 years re-
sembles the percentage reported in a 
2007 study conducted in New South 
Wales, Australia.15 As health protection 
actions are influenced by risk percep-
tion, a communication strategy will 
need to focus on providing a simple 
and convincing risk assessment16 while 
concurrently offering recipients ways 
to mitigate the risk to themselves, their 
family and their community.
The reported level of willingness to 
comply with three principal contain-
ment measures exceeded 90%, a finding 
similar to that of a 2006 study in the 
USA.9 However, with the delivery of 
minimal additional information about 
the seriousness of the disease, it was 
possible to increase this to over 97%. 
The willingness to wear a mask during a 
pandemic was surprisingly high (95%), 
particularly as this is not common prac-
tice in Australia. Use of masks by the 
general public in China, Hong Kong, 
Special Administrative Region, during 
the 2003 severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) outbreak was below this 
level. The fact that it increased from 
12% on day 10 to 85% on day 6217 
shows that the public is more likely to 
adopt NPIs as risk perception increases. 
This general willingness to wear masks 
is an excellent starting point for tar-
geted reinforcement through health 
education messages. Modelling suggests 
that the higher the secondary infection 
rate, the more compliance will be nec-
essary for NPIs to be successful.8
Study limitations
We were able to survey a large, rep-
resentative cross-section of the adult 
Australian public. However, the study 
design was based on telephone con-
tact, so that people without a landline 
telephone and those living in areas not 
connected to a telecommunication 
network were excluded. While infor-
mation is not available for the entire 
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country, in 2007 landline coverage 
was reported to be 89.3% in Western 
Australia 18 and in 2003, Queensland’s 
coverage was found to be 95.3%.19 
The personal telephone approach to 
collecting data may have encouraged 
respondents to report greater willing-
ness to comply with measures than if 
a passive reporting method, such as an 
online questionnaire, had been applied. 
It is also likely that when individuals 
are confronted with an actual pandemic 
situation and more specific information 
becomes available, their behaviour 
may deviate from their stated inten-
tion. Researchers wishing to conduct 
similar studies in countries where 
access to landline telephones is limited 
may need to consider using other survey 
methods.
Our response rate of 58% exceeds 
the recommended 50% minimum 
mark suggested by Lindner to reduce 
the threat of non-response error.20 Re-
gardless, we acknowledge that we still 
lack information about a substantial 
proportion of the target population. 
With interviewers instructed to re-
spect the right of people to decline to 
participate in surveys, obtaining data 
from this group will always remain a 
challenge. Non-responders may also be 
difficult to reach in a health emergency 
and less likely to comply with public 
health measures than responders, a fact 
that further emphasizes the value of an 
early and multi-pronged promotional 
approach.
There were 111 telephone con-
tacts with people who did not speak 
English and could not be interviewed. 
If this group is combined with other 
minorities, such as Aboriginal Austra-
lians and Torres Strait Islanders, who 
are under-represented in telephone 
ownership, then important sub-popu-
lations deserve further consideration. 
The special circumstances of people 
with low incomes and of racial and 
ethnic minorities have been previ-
ously noted.21 Out of humanitarian and 
epidemiological considerations, specific 
research based on culturally appropri-
ate methods should be conducted, to 
ensure that minorities and marginalised 
groups are not neglected during com-
munication efforts to prepare for a 
future pandemic.
Conclusion
In the early containment phase of a pan-
demic response, compliance with social 
distancing and adherence to stringent 
infection control practices will be criti-
cal for limiting community transmis-
sion. Our findings suggest that people 
with a basic knowledge level are more 
likely to comply with public health 
containment measures than those who 
lack such knowledge, yet studies in both 
Australia and the USA have shown 
that much of the public has a limited 
understanding of pandemic influenza. 
In addition, stated compliance with 
containment strategies, regardless of 
how high, can be further improved 
by providing some basic health in-
formation. We encourage investment 
in an inter-pandemic communication 
strategy that honestly and accurately 
informs the public of the threat and 
of the measures that will mitigate risk 
to themselves and to their families and 
communities. Furthermore, if such a 
strategy were applied today, it could 
have immediate value in limiting the 
transmission of other communicable 
diseases, as well as long-term benefits in 
preparing people for a sustained effort 
against pandemic influenza. A strong 
public communication plan should be 
given equal status with other NPIs in 
the global response stratagem.
This manuscript describes the first 
national survey to determine the state 
of public knowledge on pandemic 
influenza in Australia and explores im-
portant factors that may determine the 
success of containment policies such as 
social distancing and home quarantine. 
A communication strategy consisting 
of key messages and delivered through 
preferred communication channels 
would significantly increase the Austra-
lian public’s willingness to comply with 
recommended containment measures. 
Very few large national studies of this 
type have been reported in the litera-
ture, and this may be the first to actu-
ally explore the public’s understanding 
of pandemic influenza and statistically 
relate it to compliance. Obtaining in-
formation on the public’s knowledge, 
level of cooperation and preferred com-
munication channels before a pandemic 
may be useful for developing national 
communication strategies. From our 
findings policy-makers and researchers 
in other countries may come to under-
stand the issues they should explore in 
more detail in their own settings. The 
information presented in this manu-
script is important for the planning 
of successful pandemic containment 
strategies in Australia and may have in-
ternational relevance.  ■
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Résumé
Connaissances sur la grippe pandémique et observance des mesures d’endiguement par les Australiens
Objectif Etudier le niveau d’observance déclaré des mesures 
de santé publique contre la grippe pandémique et les facteurs 
influant sur la coopération des Australiens à l’endiguement de 
cette maladie.
Méthodes Une enquête par entretien téléphonique assistée par 
ordinateur a été menée par des enquêteurs professionnels pour 
recueillir des informations sur les connaissances de la population 
australienne au sujet de la grippe pandémique et sur sa volonté 
de respecter les mesures de santé publique contre cette grippe. 
L’échantillon a été randomisé en utilisant une base de données 
électronique et des annuaires téléphoniques imprimés pour garantir 
la représentativité de cet échantillon à l’égard de tous les Etats et 
tous les territoires australiens. Après avoir expliqué aux personnes 
interrogées ce qu’est la grippe pandémique pour s’assurer qu’elles 
comprennent l’importance du problème, nous avons répété les 
questions relatives à l’observance des mesures et nous avons 
analysé les variations des réponses par le test de McNemar pour 
données appariées.
Résultats 23 % seulement des 1166 personnes interrogées 
ont manifesté une compréhension claire du terme « grippe 
pandémique ». Parmi les personnes interrogées, 94,1 % ont 
indiqué qu’elles étaient disposées à respecter la quarantaine 
à domicile, 94,2 % qu’elles éviteraient les événements publics 
et 90,7 % qu’elles différeraient les rassemblements sociaux. 
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Après explication du terme « grippe pandémique » aux sujets de 
l’enquête, l’observance déclarée a augmenté significativement 
(pour atteindre respectivement 97,5 %, 98,3 % et 97,2 %). Les 
personnes ayant indiqué ne pas être familiarisées avec ce terme, 
les sujets de sexe masculin et les employés ne pouvant travailler 
à leur domicile ont manifesté une moindre disposition à respecter 
les mesures.
Conclusion En Australie, si la menace se concrétisait, l’observance 
des mesures d’endiguement contre la grippe pandémique serait 
probablement bonne, bien qu’elle puisse encore être améliorée 
par un programme d’éducation du public véhiculant juste quelques 
messages clés. Une compréhension générale de la notion de 
grippe pandémique est associée à d’une volonté déclarée de 
respecter les mesures d’endiguement. Il y aurait un intérêt 
considérable à investir maintenant dans la promotion de mesures 
pour se préparer à une pandémie ou autre urgence de santé 
publique.
Resumen
Conocimientos sobre la gripe pandémica y cumplimiento de las medidas de contención en la población 
australiana
Objetivo Determinar el grado de cumplimiento declarado de las 
medidas de salud pública contra la gripe pandémica y estudiar los 
factores que influyen en la cooperación necesaria para controlar 
esa pandemia en Australia.
Métodos Entrevistadores profesionales llevaron a cabo una 
encuesta telefónica asistida por ordenador a fin de reunir 
información sobre los conocimientos del público australiano 
acerca de la gripe pandémica y su determinación de observar las 
medidas de salud pública adoptadas para controlarla. La muestra 
fue seleccionada aleatoriamente a partir de una base de datos 
electrónica y de guías telefónicas impresas para procurar que 
fuese representativa de todos los estados y territorios australianos. 
Tras explicar a los encuestados en qué consiste la gripe pandémica 
para que entendieran la importancia del tema, se repitieron las 
preguntas sobre el cumplimiento. La variación sufrida por las 
respuestas fue analizada mediante la prueba de McNemar para 
datos apareados.
Resultados Sólo un 23% de los 1166 encuestados demostraron 
comprender cabalmente lo que supone una «gripe pandémica». 
Entre los entrevistados, un 94,1% manifestó estar dispuesto 
a cumplir una cuarentena domiciliaria; el 94,2%, a evitar 
actos públicos; y el 90,7%, a aplazar encuentros sociales. 
Después de haber explicado a los entrevistados el significado 
del término «pandemia », el cumplimiento declarado aumentó 
significativamente (al 97,5%, 98,3% y 97,2% respectivamente). 
Los que manifestaron no conocer bien el significado de la expresión 
«gripe pandémica,» los encuestados varones y los empleados que 
no podían trabajar desde su domicilio se mostraron más reacios a 
seguir las recomendaciones.
Conclusión En Australia, si se materializase la amenaza, el 
cumplimiento de las medidas de contención contra la gripe 
pandémica sería probablemente alto, no obstante lo cual podría 
mejorarse mediante un programa de educación del público que 
transmitiera simplemente unos cuantos mensajes clave. Unos 
conocimientos básicos sobre la gripe pandémica se asocian a la 
voluntad declarada de cumplir las medidas de contención. Invertir 
ahora en promover medidas de preparación para una pandemia u 
otra emergencia sanitaria constituye una opción beneficiosa.
صخلم
اهئاوتحا تاءارجلإ مهلاثتماو ةيحئاجلا ازنولفنلإا لوح ينيلاترسلأا ىدل فراعلما
 ةصاخلا ةيمومعلا ةحصلا تاءارجإب نلعلما لاثتملاا ىوتسم ةسارد :فدهلا
 نم نواعتلا لىع رثؤت يتلا لماوعلا لىع فُّرعتلاو ةيحئاجلا ازنولفنلإا ةحفاكبم
.ايلاترسأ في ةيحئاجلا ازنولفنلإا ةحفاكم لجأ
 نوينهم  اهب  ماق  بوساحلا  ةدعاسبم  ةينوفيلت  ةلباقلم  حسم  يرُجأ  :ةقيرطلا
 نع ينيلاترسلأا ىدل فراعلما لوح تامولعلما عمجل تلاباقلما في نوصصختم
 ةيمومعلا  ةحصلا  تاءارجلإ  لاثتملال  مهدادعتسا  لوحو  ةيحئاجلا  ازنولفنلإا
 تايطعم ةدعاق مادختساب ًايئاوشع ةنيعلا رايتخا مت دقو .ةحفاكلماب ةصاخلا
 عيمجل ةلثمم ةنيعلا نوك نماضل فتاوهلا ماقرلأ ةعوبطم لئلادو ةينوتركيلإ
 ةيهام  ينبيجتسملل  نوثحابلا  فصو  نأ  دعبو  .ةيلاترسلاا  ضيارلأاو  تايلاولا
 دق لاثتملاا لكاشم نإف كلذ ةيمهأو اهل  مهمهف نماضل ةيحئاجلا  ازنولفنلإا
 تايطعملل رماين كام رابتخاب اهليلحت مت دق ةباجتسلاا في تايرغتلاو ترركت
.ةجودزلما
 حلطصلم  ًاحضاو  ًماهف  ًابيجتسم 1166 ينب  نم  %23 رهظأ  دقل  :تادوجولما
 مهنم %94.1 غلبأ  مهتلباقم تتم نيذلا  ءلاؤه نمو .»ةيحئاجلا  ازنولفنلإا«
 بنجتل  مهنم  %94.2و  ،ليزنلما  يحصلا  رجحلل  لاثتملال  مهدادعتسا  نع
 حشر  نأ  دعبو  .ةيعماتجلاا  تابسانلما  ليجأتل  %90.7و  ةيمومعلا  ثادحلأا
 لاثتملاا  نع نلاعلإا  داز  ،تلاباقلما  في كترشا  نلم ”ةحئاجلا“  ىنعم نوثحابلا
 رجحلل لاثتملال مهدادعتسا اودبأ نَم ىدل %97.5 لىإ لصوف ةظوحلم ةدايز
 ،ةيمومعلا ثادحلأا بُّنجتل هدادعتسا ىدبأ نَم ىدل %98.3و ليزنلما يحصلا
 ناك نم امأ .ةيعماتجلاا تابسانلما ليجأتل هدادعتسا ىدبأ نم ىدل %97.2و
 ازنولفنلإا حلطصم عم مهفلآت مدع نع اوغلبأ دقف كلذل لاثتملال ًادادعتسا لقأ
.مهتويب نم لمعلا نوعيطتسي لا نيذلا ينلماعلاو روكذلا نم ةيحئاجلا
 مازتللاا  نإف  ايلاترسأ  في  ةيحئاجلا  ازنولفنلإاب  ديدهتلا  رهظ  اذإ  :جاتنتسلاا
 نكيم  نكلو  ،ًاعفترم  نوكي  نأ  بلغي  ةيحئاجلا  ازنولفنلإا  ءاوتحا  تاءارجإب
 .لئاسر  عضب  سانلل  لقني  يمومع  يفيقثت  جمانرب  للاخ  نم  ثركأ  هزيزعت
 لاثتملال دادعتسلاا نع نلاعلإا عم نمازتي ةيحئاجلا ازنولفنلإل سياسلأا مهفلاف
 زيزعتلا  تاءارجإ  في  نهارلا  تقولا  في  رماثتسلاا  ُّدَعُيو  .اهئاوتحا  تاءارجلإ
.ماه ةميق اذ ةيحصلا ئراوطلا نم اهيرغلو تايحئاجلل ب ُّهأتلل
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